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INTRODUCTION
The two sides of the intercountry adoption debate seem worlds apart.
Proponents view international adoption as an effective solution to stop the
proliferation of institutionalized and street orphans across the globe. To
them, intercountry adoption is a panacea-offering a potential solution to
such diverse issues as children orphaned after war and disaster; adults who
are unable to conceive; global intolerance; and the limited resources of
developing nations. On the other hand, critics of intercountry adoptions
view it as modem-day imperialism, allowing dominant, developed cultures
to strip away a developing country's most precious resources, its children.
3
Moreover, the view one holds in the debate impacts how subsidiary issues
such as culture, family, rights, and sovereignty are treated.
The emotional nature of intercountry adoption often leads each side to
demonize the other, impeding the ability to find common ground.4
Moreover, keeping the debate focused on whether intercountry adoption is
good or bad is problematic; there will always be compelling arguments on
either side, and compelling reasons to which each can point in support of
their position. As such, focusing on the positives or negatives in the debate
amounts to a stand-off in which neither side is willing to compromise any
ground, a perpetual lose-lose situation.
Yet are these two sides really so far apart? Is there not another way of
examining the debate that accommodates both viewpoints and makes
allowances for each side? What if, for instance, one legal instrument could
accommodate both one country's view that culture should be paramount in
deciding a child's adoption and a prospective parent's desire to adopt across
cultural lines? These are not simply rhetorical questions. Currently, many
countries (predominantly potential sending countries) refuse to participate in
intercountry adoptions.5  These countries refuse to allow intercountry
In this article I use the term intercountry, international and transnational adoption
interchangeably.
2 See generally Stacie I. Strong, Children's Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a
New Goal, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163 (1995) (discussing adoption as a human right).
3 See Curtis Kleem, Note, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319, 325-326
(2000).
4 See, e.g., David Smolin, The Two Faces ofIntercountry Adoption: The Significance of
the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 403, 465 (2005)[hereinafter Smolin,
Indian Adoption Scandals] (discussing the tension held on either side of an adoption scandal in
India).
5 See, e.g., LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF TANZANIA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
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adoption largely because of issues that fall under the rubric of family,
culture, and rights. In crafting a framework that accommodates all sides of
the debate we can move the process forward to a more fluid structure that
takes into consideration both sides of the debate.
To do so we must start from a different premise, one where a prism of
choice frames the intercountry adoption debate. Instead of locking the
groups in a war of right and wrong, each group in the intercountry adoption
debate can work together within a framework that is flexible enough to
accommodate the different arguments and the hierarchical presumptions that
embody each approach. This paper argues that such an approach to
international adoption is possible if we analyze how each side of the debate
treats the main axes of debate: issues of culture, family, and rights.
Accordingly, the thesis of this paper provides that one can develop a
framework that accommodates each side by recognizing the importance it
attaches to each of these axes. Under this paradigm, this Paper examines the
legal landscape, not to determine whether it facilitates or restricts
intercountry adoption, but to determine how successful it is at
accommodating the various viewpoints towards intercountry adoption and
its underlying presumptions regarding family, rights, and culture.
The main legal instrument governing intercountry adoption is the
Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Intercountry Adoption (the "Hague Convention").6 Most commentators who
have examined the Hague Convention have done so from the perspective of
determining whether the Hague Convention facilitates or impedes
intercountry adoption and, depending on their viewpoint, what changes need
to be made to bring the Hague Convention in line with their philosophical
perspective.7 This paper takes a different approach. Rather than looking at
THE LAW RELATING TO CHILDREN IN TANZANIA § 298 (April 1994), available at http://lrct-
tz.org/pdf/watoto.pdf (discussing Tanzania's prohibition of adoption by any adult from a non
East African country). Many of the issues that play into intercountry adoptions also impact
those countries that have prohibitions on sending their children out to be adopted. However,
the analysis of these countries and their assumptions and rhetoric are outside the scope of this
paper.
6 The Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of intercountry
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1993 U.S.T. Lexis 106, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.
php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=69[hereinafter Hague Convention].
I See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human
Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179 (2003)
(discussing how to transform the Hague Convention in such a way as to facilitate intercountry
adoptions); Nicole Bartner Graft, Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled?, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
405 (2000) (discussing ways the Hague Convention can restrict the practice of intercountry
adoption by curtailing illegal activities).
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whether the Hague Convention facilitates or inhibits intercountry adoption, I
will examine how well it provides a framework for accommodating the
choices and the hierarchal preferences that each country and each
prospective parent must make within the axes of rights, family, and culture.
To that extent, I will also examine whether the Hague Convention can
adequately provide that framework.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part One will provide a general
overview of the intercountry adoption debate, discussing how each side
approaches the debate and the underlying assumption that each side makes
in support of its argument. Part Two will examine two legal instruments on
adoption, one international (the Hague Convention) and one domestic (the
Indian Child Welfare Act? or "ICWA"), as a basis for analyzing where
current legal instruments fall within the traditional paradigms of the debate.
Part Three will examine how the debate plays out within three major axes:
on issues of family, rights, and culture. This part will provide a more
detailed analysis on how the Hague Convention addresses these issues and in
what ways, if any, the ICWA can provide an alternative framework. In
doing so, I will examine how the drafters treated each one of three distinct
paradigms: family, rights, and culture. Part Four will offer my analysis
regarding the Hague Convention's ability to provide an accommodating
framework.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE
A. The Context
Intercountry adoption occurs when a child from his or her country of
origin is moved to another country, where he or she will live with adoptive
parents.9 It implies the total and definitive rupture of his or her relationship
with the biological family.'0 Historically, intercountry adoption had its
genesis in a post World War II climate when soldiers returning home
spotlighted attention on children orphaned by the war. 1 Under the Marshall
Plan, the U.S. was pouring millions of dollars into rebuilding Allied
8 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 [hereinafter ICWA].
9 UN Children's Fund, Guidance Note on Intercountry Adoption in the CEE/CIS Baltics
Region (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Guidancenote_ Intercountry_
adoption.pdf )[hereinafter "UNICEF Baltics Report"].
10 Id.
" UN Children's Fund, Intercountry Adoption, INNOCENTI DIG. 4, 1999, at 2 available at
http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest4e.pdf [hereinafter INNOCENTI DIGEST],
see also discussion infra § I.B.1
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countries decimated by the war.' 2 However, intercountry adoption took a
markedly distinct tack. Instead of committing resources to helping orphans
within the country, the solution was to pull the children out of the country,
and thus out of the problem, by providing them with homes elsewhere.
3
While intercountry adoption at that time was child-driven, there were seeds
of the larger intercountry adoption debate that would grow in years to
come.' 4
The second wave of intercountry adoption occurred after the Korean
War.' 5 Korean culture dissuaded the use of domestic adoption as a means of
caring for war orphans. In addition, the combination of mixed ancestry
children (usually Asian American) led many more Americans to become
involved in intercountry adoption.16 Since then, intercountry adoption has
evolved. What began as a means of helping children after war has become,
for many, a way to create a family when traditional biological or domestic
options are unavailable.'
7
Factors affecting the increase of people in receiving countries turning to
international adoption include: (1) a high infertility rate; (2) increased
acceptance of intercountry adoption; (3) easy access to abortion; (4)
decreased availability of domestic children for adoption;' 8 and (5)
12 See Daniel Fung, Constitutional Reform in China: The Case of Hong Kong, 39 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 467, 467 (2004) (discussing the Marshall Plan to rebuild after WWII and its
consequences for Europe). See also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., Marshall Plan,
http://usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshalU (last visited March 14, 2007).
13 See INNOCENTI DIGEST, supra note 11, at 2.
14 One of the recurring criticisms that has been levied against intercountry adoption is that
it is a paternalistic solution, one in which the children who are being adopted are viewed as
needing rescue from their plight. This view either dismisses, or minimizes the benefit to the
child in staying in his home or the concomitant trauma that would result to an already
traumatized child who is forced to leave his home, his tribe and his culture for an unknown
future.
1' Nicole Bartner Graff, Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on the Roghts of the
Child: Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled? 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 405,
405 (2000).
16 Deborah Kay, The 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: Potential for Success or Failure, 2 NEW ENG.
INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. available at http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol2/hague.htm (1996).
'7 See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, 102 (1993) (arguing that
adoption should be considered as an alternative to fertility treatments).
18 Michele Goodwin, The Free Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 68 (2006). In reality, the shortage of children for domestic
adoption is a shortage of white children. There are still many African American children in
the domestic adoption system. This disparity occurs for two main reasons: (1) white
Americans (who make up a majority of prospective parents), feel uncomfortable adopting
black children, and (2) many advocates in the black community discourage interracial
adoptions. See BARTHOLET supra note 17, at 97.
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established networks of intercountry adoption. 19 On the sending side,
factors include: (1) difficult social and economic conditions; (2) migration to
urban areas; (3) the breakdown of extended families; (4) high pregnancy
rates among unmarried women; (5) difficulty in obtaining abortions; (6) an
increase in unwed mothers heading households; and (7) high unemployment20
rates.
With the advent of a parent-driven model to intercountry adoption, the
dynamics of international adoption changed. A market of adoption
developed where children were seen as supplying a demand.2' While the
rate of intercountry adoption increased steadily in the last two decades,
overall, it affects a very small population, particularly in sending countries.
22
One study concluded:
Our statistics.., indicate that a very small proportion of the
children at risk in most countries of origin are either 'saved' or
'harvested' through the process of intercountry adoption. One
could thus argue that individual children are benefiting from this
migration, but that the movement of children, per se, is not
significantly affecting the human resources of most countries of
origin nor the numbers of the children at risk.
23
B. The Debate
In its simplest form, the intercountry adoption debate is between two
seemingly disparate concepts. There are those who believe that saving
children without families by bringing them into loving, adoptive homes
should always occur, at whatever cost.2 4 On the other side are those who
believe that intercountry adoption is modem day reverse colonization: taking
children out of developing countries and bringing them into developed
25countries. One author offers an excellent summary of the debate:
To some intercountry adoption in itself is more or less a form of
child trafficking, as it involves the transfer of children from poor
nations to rich nations in order to meet the demand of those in
rich nations for children. The fact that those seeking to adopt
19 Saralee Kane, The Movement of Children for International Adoption: An Epidemiologic
Perspective, 30 THE SOC. SCI. J. 4,313 (1993).
20 Id.
21 See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 67.
22 Kane, supra note 19, at 335.
23 Id. at 336.
24 Smolin, Indian Adoption Scandals, supra note 4, at 453.
25 See Graff, supra note 15, at 406.
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want daughters and sons, not sex or labor, seems to make little
difference... it is still a matter of the citizens of rich countries
using their wealth and power to "buy" the vulnerable of the
poor.... those who really care about the suffering of children in
developing nations should provide assistance and help to
children within their own societies, rather than spending
inordinate sums to strip children of their national identity, native
culture and language.
By contrast, those most supportive of intercountry adoption
perceive literally millions of children in need of intercountry
adoption in developing and transition economy nations.
Children abandoned, killed, left in dismal orphanages, or living
on the street bear horrific testimony to the pressing need for
adoption. From this perspective, ethical or political objections
to intercountry adoption lack legitimacy, since they sacrifice the
concrete good of children to ideological idols.
26
The rhetoric on these two sides allows little room for accommodation.
Proponents of international adoption believe that nothing is more sacrosanct
than preserving the lives of children.27  Critics of intercountry adoption
believe that the colonialist and paternalistic notions are apparent and, in the
extreme, have compared this type of adoption to genocide. 28  Further
complicating matters is that these two opposing camps cannot be tracked
along typical ideological lines; there are political liberals and political
conservatives on both sides of the debate. 29  This can make strange
bedfellows, with the ACLU and political conservatives advocating for the
same cause.
3 0
26 David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 281,
283 (2004)[hereinafter Smolin, Child Trafficking Article]. (Smolin and I start from the same
perspective. We both believe that continuing the intercountry adoption debate on ideological
grounds has limited usefulness. However, Smolin and I differ in how we structure the
framework. Moreover, for Smolin the framework to be applied is restricted to detecting the
limits of intercountry adoption. I, instead, construct a different framework by using ICWA to
see if our current legal instrument (namely the Hague Convention) is suitable for
accommodating the different sides of the debate.)
27 Id.
28 Antonio Buti, The Australian 'Stolen Generations' and Reparations 6 (Mar. 2006)
(paper presented at the University of Texas Law School) (on file with author).
29 For instance, Christian conservatives believe in intercountry adoption as one form of
evangelism, allowing children from developing countries to be raised in a Christian home.
Smolin, Indian Adoption Article, supra note 4, at 455. On the other side, liberals believe that
intercountry adoption is one of the best ways to promote the rights of children. Dillon, supra
note 7, at 180.
30 See ACLU, CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND
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Madonna's recent attempt to adopt a Malawian child illustrates the
problem. Late in 2006, Madonna and her husband, Guy Ritchie, traveled to
Malawi to survey progress on an orphanage they were building. 31 Shortly
thereafter, news reports broke that the pop idol and her husband were
adopting a young boy from the country. 32  The reaction was swift and
adamant on both sides. Human rights organizations protested the manner of
the adoption, claiming that Madonna had circumvented local law that
requires any adoptive parent to reside in the country. 33 The human rights
organizations used that as a springboard to claim that Madonna was using
her vast wealth to take advantage of the situation and circumvent the
adoption process. 34 In contrast, many people in the Western world did not
understand why Madonna's adoption was controversial. To them, it was a
heroic act by a woman willing to give a child the kind of opportunities
normally not within his reach. In the end, the Malawian court granted
Madonna an "interim adoption," awarding her custody of the child for
eighteen months.
35
As such, the Madonna adoption highlights one consistent demarcation
in the debate, the divergent views of sending countries (typically developing
countries like Peru and Malawi), and receiving countries (most often
developed countries such as the United States). For receiving countries, the
advent of international adoption is a way to facilitate the demand made by
prospective parents for children that are not available domestically. Others
within receiving states believe intercountry adoption is a noble act that often
rescues children. Sending countries are not so optimistic.
FAMILIES 55 (2005)[hereinafter "CAUGHT IN THE NET"] (advocating for more restrictive
adoption controls to protect the rights of imprisoned mothers). See
http://vlz.es/urlext.php?ext-http://www.churchexecutive.com/Page.cfm/PageID/9238 (stating
discussing a summit to teach Christian leaders how to adopt locally and internationally).
31 Maddie Denies Adoption, THE SYDNEY MORNNG HERALD (Oct. 5, 2006)
http://www.smh.com.au/news/music/maddie-deniesadoption/2006/10/05/1159641427301.html
(discussing the purpose of the visit to Malawi-to oversee the building of an orphanage).
32 Reports differ on the age of the child, with the youngest estimate putting him at three
months in Oct. 2006 and the oldest estimates placing his age at one year. See Madonna Given
Interim Adoption, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 16, 2006) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
entertainment/6056912.stm (placing the child's age at three months); Adoption: Material
Mommy, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 2006 at 8, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
15267323/site/newsweek (placing his age at one year).
"3 Madonna Given Interim Adoption, BBC NEWS, October 16, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6056912.stm.
3 Adoption: Material Mommy, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 2006 at 8, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/I 5267323/site/newsweek
35 BBC NEWS, (Oct. 16, 2006) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6056912.stm
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1. The Good
To proponents of the system, intercountry adoption offers the best
solution for children without parents and parents without children.36  In
addition, given the poverty and destitution faced by these children,
intercountry adoption seems to provide an opportunity to literally save
children from such fates as child pornography, prostitution, or forced labor.
In contrast, many of the arguments advanced against transnational adoption
seem much more esoteric: few seem to agree with the notion that subjecting
a child to racism is a much greater evil than forcing a child to live on the
streets. To proponents, the practical reality of institutionalized children
takes precedence over obscure notions of cultural paternalism and baby-
selling.
37
Six arguments are used most often by proponents of intercountry
adoption. First, intercountry adoption fulfills the mandate of what some
scholars claim is a child's right not to be institutionalized.38 Second, adults
who wish to be parents have the opportunity to do so by choosing to adopt
internationally. 39  As a third and related point, international adoption
provides parents to children without families. Fourth, intercountry
adoption alleviates the world's ills by taking children away from countries
with overtaxed resources and reducing the overall number of homeless
children. 41 Fifth, adopting children from one country and bringing them to
another promotes tolerance and diversity by creating families with different
42national and ethnic backgrounds. Finally, intercountry adoption provides
additional opportunities for non-traditional families, such as single parents
and homosexual couples.43
To some advocates, intercountry adoption provides a way to fulfill a
36 Stacie Strong, Children 's Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a New Goal, 13
B.U. INT'L L. J. 163, 169 (1995).
31 See Dillon, supra note 7, at 200 (stating "in no sense could the right of a child to enjoy
a particular culture be said to trump the more fundamental right to be loved and protected as an
individual.").
31 Id. at 212.
'9 BARTHOLET, supra note 17, at 47.
40 Lisa Katz, A Modest Proposal? The Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect ofIntercountry Adoption, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 283, 291 (1995).
41 See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 7, at 226 (discussing how, despite overtaxed resources,
many nations prefer to see orphans "languishing" then having them adopted internationally.)
42 JEAN NELSON ERICHSEN & HEtNO ERICHSEN, HOW TO ADOPT INTERNATIONALLY 8
(2003).
43 See generally Lisa Hillis, Intercountry Adoption under the Hague Convention: Still an
Attractive Option for Homosexuals Seeking to Adopt? 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 237,
237 (1998).
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child's basic human right not to be institutionalized.44  Sara Dillon, the
major proponent of this view, writes that intercountry adoption is one
method of achieving a child's right to a family.45  Dillon acknowledges
concerns regarding intercountry adoption's inextricable link to a history of
colonialism and imperialism. 46  However, Dillon sees these as distinct
concepts and contends that intercountry adoption must be viewed solely
within the context of individualized children's rights.47 Dillon notes:
[I]t may be asked... how a multicultural world can agree on a set
of standards with regard to children's rights. The ideas of
wealthy northern countries about the role of the child are likely
to clash with deeply held ideas in the developing world. It may
be argued that what are termed international children's rights
actually reflect the biases of a certain part of the world and can
in no way be considered universal.
48
Dillon further reasons that "the psychology of small children varies
little from culture to culture and, as with the law on torture, law relating to
the needs of small children ought not to take into account local variations.
49
In presenting this argument, Dillon represents those who believe that the
care of a child and the formation of the family trump any notion of cultural
preservation.
Proponents for intercountry adoption also advance parent-driven
arguments. Rather than compete for healthy white children who are in short
supply in countries like the United States, proponents instead advocate
seeking adoptable children in other countries. This is also known as the
"' Dillon, supra note 7, at 187.
45 Id.
4 Id.
47 Id. at 188.
48 Id. at 192.
49 Id. (while Dillon's argument on the right of children not to be institutionalized seems
well thought out, her response to the cultural argument miss the point. Those who value a
sense of culture are not concerned with the current culture of the small child, but rather his or
her future exposure to the culture of their birth. Children who are adopted out of their country
of origin, both individually and as a group, will experience a meaningful loss of their birth
culture. And, while Dillon's argument is at its strongest when she compares those children
who are currently in institutions (which was admittedly the focus of her article), her argument
on a position for intercountry adoption that is within the context of individual rights for the
child may be less persuasive in those situations where the child is living in foster care, or
where a child has been given up by her biological parents for pecuniary gain.).
" Sara R. Wallace, International Adoption: The Most Logical Solution to the Disparity
between the Number of Orphaned and Abandoned Children in Some Countries and Families
and Individuals Wishing to Adopt in Others?, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 693 (2003).
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market of adoption debate. 51 This idea now manifests itself on a policy
level. Originally intercountry adoption developed to help "war orphans."
Now, there is a prohibition on the international adoption of refugees from
wars and natural disasters.53 This debate has also taken various tangents
derived from the parent-driven model: the debate on a market approach to
adoption; 54 advocacy for consumer protection laws for adoptive parents who
were misinformed as to their adoptive child's health; 55 and the advent of
adoption as baby-selling. 56 Parent-driven advocates emphasize the benefits
of intercountry adoption for prospective parents such as fewer delays than
domestic adoptions; 57 increased pool of non-African American babies; 58 and
"' See Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Barriers to the Successful Implementation of the Hague
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,
33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 561, 566 (2005); Kay, supra note 16 ("[1]ntercountry adoption
has been known since the post war years, but what was originally a humanitarian movement in
response to the needs of young victims of war has more recently tended to develop as a service
for childless couples.") (quoting Jennifer Home-Roberts, Intercountry Adoption, 142 NEW L.J.
286, 286 (1992)).
52 Katz, supra note 40, at 285.
53 See Richard R. Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis of
the Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243, 248-49 (1994) (noting the
Hague Conference's decision to avoid the issue of refugee adoption. Later on, with respect to
the tsunami specifically, the Permanent Bureau noted "[l]n the spirit of [the 1994
recommendation], it is clear that in a disaster situation, like that brought about by the tsunami,
efforts to reunify a displaced child with his or her parents or family members must take
priority and that premature and unregulated attempts to organise the adoption of such a child
abroad should be avoided and resisted.") See THE PERMANENT BUREAU, Draft Guide to Good
Practice Under the Hague Convention of May 29, 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 73 (August 2005)[hereinafter Guide to Good
Practice], available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/adopd02e.pdf. This can lead to a
whole separate avenue of debate: Is the policy toward not adopting refugee children done to
protect the child? (i.e., intercountry adoption would only create further trauma for a child who
has already been through so much loss of stability.) Or is it being done to prevent disruption
in the market of adoption? (i.e., because refugees' origins are so unstable, we should avoid any
disruption that adopting them would cause for the prospective parents, especially when there
are other children available to adopt?).
5 Graff, supra note 7, at 405.
5 Donovan Steltzner, Intercountry Adoption: Toward a Regime that Recognizes the 'Best
Interests' of Adoptive Parents, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 113, 115 (2003).
56 Gina Croft, The Ill-Effects of a United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of lntercountry Adoption, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 621, 635 (2005).
" Steltzner, supra note 55, at 119.
58 Id. Steltzner notes that many prospective parents turn to international adoption to avoid
adopting African American children. See also MYRA ALPERSON, THE INTERNATIONAL
ADOPTION HANDBOOK 144 (1997) (stating "I also had to deal honestly and bluntly with my
own personal limits [in deciding to adopt internationally instead of domestically]. I didn't
know if I could cope with an African American child.").
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avoiding potential litigation by birth parents.59
Other arguments in support of intercountry adoption advance the best
interests of the child.60  Proponents reason that many children eligible for
international adoption currently reside in institutions or on the streets. As
such, intercountry adoption provides the basic needs for a child within a
family environment, a far superior situation than the alternatives.
61
Moreover, given that intercountry adoption occurs mainly in developing
countries struggling with poverty, proponents point out that these countries
do not have the resources to devote to the care needed for those children.
62
Many believe that one of the key benefits of intercountry adoption is
that it promotes tolerance and cultural awareness.63 For these advocates,
adopting children of different cultural backgrounds exposes the public to
problems of the developing world.64 It also sheds light on issues of racism
domestically when the parents must come in direct contact with the racism
their children face.
65
Finally, advocates note that adults who would be considered
undesirable as domestic adoptive parents, such as single men and women,
homosexual couples, or older adults, can adopt internationally with fewer
problems. 66 At a minimum, these advocates place intercountry adoption on
19 Id. at 120. Typically under U.S. law, birth parents have a certain amount of time after
an adoption is finalized to petition for custody. No such provision exists under the Hague
Convention. See also ERICHSEN & ERICHSEN, supra note 42, at 8.
0 The best interest of the child standard has been advanced by both proponents and critics
of adoption.
61 Dillon, supra note 7, at 200.
62 See Wallace, supra note 50, at 693 (noting that "[t]he practice of international adoption
is prevalent in countries where not only families, but also countries themselves, cannot care for
their orphaned or abandoned children."). See also Christine Narad & Patrick W. Mason,
InternationalAdoptions: Myths and Realities, 30 PEDIATRIC NURSING Nov./Dec 2004, at 483.
Narad & Mason identify what they call five "myths" of international adoption including: (1)
that adoptees were raised in an environment that will meet their needs; (2) that medical reports
will contain accurate and complete information; (3) that any delays in the child's development
is normal; (4) a child can be quickly integrated into a family's routine; and, (5) all the child
needs is love. Instead, the authors paint a stark picture of the life of international adoptees,
who, according to Narad & Mason were more than likely raised in an institution where
children are tied to beds, fed quickly by uninterested caregivers and live in an environment
where they are unable to interact grow or develop. Further, Narad & Mason note "[c]ountries
that are overburdened with the need to care for large numbers of abandoned children are also
often faced with poverty and economic instability, and the needs of abandoned children are
usually low priority.".
63 See ERICHSEN & ERICHSEN, supra note 42, at 8.
6 Id. (stating "[s]uddenly you view your child's homeland as yours as well.").
65 See generally GAIL STEINBERG & BETH HALL, INSIDE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
(2000) (particularly Section 2 on "Racial Identity").
6 See, e.g., Hillis, supra note 43, at 237.
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equal footing with domestic adoption. Some believe that the comparative
ease and unique cultural benefit of intercountry adoption makes it a
generally superior choice for all people interested in adopting. 67 For these
advocates, there should be no differential treatment in prospective parents
who are foreigners and prospective parents who are local.
2. The Bad
The most vocal critics of international adoption argue that it is a form of
modem-day imperialism. 68 Instead of imposing a set of culture and values
from the outside in, this form of imperialism takes a child and forces him to
adjust to a new, seemingly better way of life. 69 This form of imperialism,
which I call reverse imperialism, is particularly insidious because it occurs
under the guise of saving children. Critics argue that children are a precious
commodity to a developing nation.70  Taking these children away is the
equivalent of stripping a country of its natural resources, a modern form of
colonialism.
71
Some have argued that intercountry adoption takes away a child's
nationality, thereby denying him the right to his proper cultural identity.72
To these critics, the ramifications are severe and affect the child's
psychological stability.
73
Other critics have argued that turning to other countries for adoption
merely exacerbates problems of the domestic foster care system in the
United States.74 To these critics, if Americans did not have intercountry
adoption as a potential solution, then perhaps there would be more of an
impetus to change the current structure of foster care so that more American
67 ERICHSEN & ERICHSEN, supra note 42, at 8.
68 Kleem, supra note 3, at 325.
69 Id. at 325-326.
70 Id.
72 Id. at 325. This has manifested in rumors of organ harvesting; some critics of
intercountry adoption claimed that babies were being adopted so that their organs might be
used for other children the parents already had. Id. at 326.
72 Linda J. Olsen, Live or Let Die: Could Intercountry Adoption Make the Difference?, 22
PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 483,510 (2004).
13 D. Marianne Bower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic Constitutions
and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person 's Identities and Heritage:
A Comparative Examination, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. REV. 587,646 (2001).
7 See Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for our Own: Why American Adoption Law and
Policy Must Change, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 327, 334 (1997)(stating "[w]hatever the
reason for the changing numbers, many prospective parents claim they cannot find children to
adopt in the United States. This is unfortunate, because, in fact there is no shortage of
American children who need permanent homes.").
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children would be eligible for adoption. 75 These critics view intercountry
adoption as going against the spirit (if not the letter) of the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") and its embodiment of strong cultural
rights for children.76
Internally, many sending countries have increasingly shied away from
intercountry adoption, demonstrating a deep-seated, fundamental discomfort
with the notion. For these countries, intercountry adoption is a source of
shame that highlights their limited resources. 78  In recent years, ?ressure
from countries in the developed world has exacerbated this shame. 9 As a
result, many countries that had previously been the main source of children
in intercountry adoptions have now proscribed the practice. For instance,
China and Korea, traditionally two major sending countries, have restricted
intercountry adoptions in the wake of domestic societal pressure to take care
of its own. In 2000, Russia was the second highest country of origin of
intercountry adoptions.82  In 2006 it placed a ban on intercountry
adoptions. 83 This was perhaps inevitable. As one author wrote:
[T]he Russian people are very sensitive to the fact that they have
so many children they cannot adequately care for. They
consider it a slight that other nations view Russia as being in the
company of third-world countries with similar problems. Some
Russians look at this as a matter of national pride, and see the
international adoption scheme as a road toward "cultural
genocide."
' 84
During 1990 and 1991, Romania was one of the primary countries from
which to adopt children.85  In 2004, under pressure from the European
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC]. In particular, Articles 7 and 8 address provisions of the child's rights
within the context of culture.
77 Kimball, supra note 51, at 579.
78 id.
'9 Noelle Knox, Romania to Make its Ban on International Adoptions Permanent, USA
TODAY, June 16, 2004 at 9D (discussing pressure Romania received from the European Union
to end its practices).
80 Id.
81 Kleem, supra note 3, at 325 (describing the pressure felt in sending countries over
intercountry adoptions).
82 Steltzner, supra note 55, at 124.
83 Oliver Bullough, REUTERS, May 23, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/
world/europe/articles/2006/05/23/russia-moves to restrict foreignadoptions/
84 Steltzner, supra note 55, at 125.
8 Adoption Institute: International Adoption Facts http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/
FactOverview/international.html (last visited on May 13, 2007) (providing a table of sending
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Union, an organization it wished to join, Romania placed a permanent ban
on the adoption of children.86  As the leading receiving country for
international adoption from Romania, the U.S. waged a full public relations
campaign to stop the ban from passing.87 But in the end, the Romanian
government claimed that the ban was the only way to prevent corruption in
the system.
88
Many Middle Eastern countries proscribe intercountry adoption
outright. 8  For these predominantly Muslim countries, the Koran prohibits
adoption for lineage purposes.90 As such, adoption of children outside of the
biological line represents a prohibitive genealogical break. 91 Instead, many
Middle Eastern countries have developed an alternative form of adoption
entitled kafalah.92 This form of care allows children to be tended to by
another family without the attendant changes in name or inheritance rights
that accompanies traditional adoption.
93
3. The Ugly
Of course, outside of the theoretical vacuum, not all debates play out so
neatly. Many participants in the intercountry adoption debate hold a
derivative position-somewhere between viewing intercountry adoption as
good or viewing intercountry adoption as bad. People who position
themselves in these camps generally start with either an optimistic or a
pessimistic framework. For the optimists, intercountry adoption, in theory,
may provide one of the best solutions for the current plight of children.
Optimists believe that intercountry adoption, ideally, offers a win-win
situation for those parents who wish to have children and those children who
need parents. However, while optimists acknowledge the ideals of
countries and background on the history of Romanian adpoptions). INNOCENTI DIGEST, supra
note 11, at 4.
86 Romania to Make its Ban on International Adoptions Permanent, USA TODAY, June
16, 2004, at 9D.
87 Id.
88 Id. The irony is that although traditional orphans (children without either parent) is
what motivates people to allow their children to be adopted in the first place, in the end critics
say, the worst source of corruption comes when the children who are actually adopted do not
come from institutions at all but from either being sold by their parents or kidnapped by
children traffickers. Id (stating "the accounts of rescued orphans [in Romania] were replaced
by stories of Romanian mothers being paid to give up their children."
89 J.H.A. Van Loon, REPORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION (Preliminary document No. 1
of the Hague Conference) (1990) [hereinafter Van Loon, REPORT] 25.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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intercountry adoption, they are concerned with its practical implementation
and the abuses that result. Baby selling and corruption are the two most
often raised issues. 94 Presumably, people in this camp believe that, absent
corruption and irregularities, intercountry adoption could be a primary
method for eradicating child poverty and homelessness. Optimists derive
their view of intercountry adoption from the "good," in that they believe that
intercountry adoption at its core should be saved. Therefore, optimists focus
much of their advocacy on eradicating corruption from the intercountry
adoption system.
95
The pessimists start from a different perspective. Philosophically, they
believe that intercountry adoption can never act as more than a band-aid on
the issue of child poverty and limited resources. For them, the next step in
moving the issue forward is not eradicating corruption from intercountry
adoption but rather eradicating the root causes that lead to intercountry
adoption in the first place.96 For pessimists, intercountry adoption acts as a
short-term solution, a necessary stop-gap to be used until other methods are
developed to address the underlying causes of why so many children are
orphaned.97 To pessimists, a "victory" in the intercountry adoption debate
would be for intercountry adoption to become obsolete.
98
A corollary position for pessimists is the notion of subsidiarity-that all
efforts should be used to place orphans first in their country of origin. Only
after these efforts fail should intercountry adoption be considered.99 As the
Permanent Bureau' 00 notes "[lt]he subsidiarity principle is central to the
success of [intercountry adoption]. It implies that efforts should be made to
assist families in remaining intact or in being reunited, or to ensure that a
9 See Kristina Wilken, Controlling Improper Financial Gain in International Adoptions,
2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 85, 86 (1995).
9' For instance, the Permanent Bureau also noted that "[p]rotection of families is one of
the safeguards envisaged by the Convention to protect children from abduction, sale or
trafficking for the purposes of adoption. ... Families and children also need protection from
the more subtle forms of exploitation, and protective measures are envisaged in the
Convention to prevent undue pressure on, or coercion, inducement or solicitation of birth
families to relinquish a child." See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 18.
9 This happens on two fronts. First would be eradicating the underlying causes of
orphans in developing nations (typically, AIDS, malnutrition, conflict). Second would be
equipping the country with better resources to be able to internally assist those children who
inevitably do become orphans.
" Smolin, Indian Adoption Scandals, supra note 4, at 453.
98 Id.
99 Id.
00 For a good overview of the Hague Conference and its role as an intergovernmental
organization see INNOCENTI DIGEST, supra note 11, at 15-16. The Permanent Bureau is
responsible for monitoring legislating and advising countries on bringing national law in line
with Hague Convention. Id.
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child has the opportunity to be adopted or cared for nationally."'' 0
For the pessimists, intercountry adoption can never be a viable
alternative while money is a part of the system.10 2  The potential for
financial gain will inevitably cause distortion due to the constant edge it
gives developed countries over developing countries.1 3 This, scholars point
out, puts intercountry adoption in direct competition with the principles of
subsidiarity and creates a "distortion in the market" because foreigners can
pay more for adoptions than locals can.' 4  UNICEF, as well as many
sending countries, takes this side of the debate.
According to UNICEF, intercountry adoption "is intended solely as an
indivdualised child welfare measure.... Intercountry adoption is therefore to
be considered as a very exceptional measure and one that cannot be looked
at in isolation. It is one possible option in an overall child welfare and
protection policy.' : °  Further, UNICEF operates under three guiding
principles regarding long-term childcare: (1) family-based solutions are
generally preferable to institutional placements; (2) permanent solutions are
largely superior to inherently temporary ones; and (3) in-country solutions
are generally better than those involving other countries.10 6  Because
intercountry adoption embodies the first two solutions but not the third,
UNICEF views intercountry adoption as "invariably" a subsidiary
solution. 1 In addition, even when compared against other solutions that
encompass two out of the three criteria, UNICEF argues that intercountry
adoption "must be weighed carefully against any others that also meet two
of these basic principles."'
0 8
Another perspective on the intercountry adoption issue is the one
developed by the Permanent Bureau itself. The Permanent Bureau
articulated a three-tiered system regarding the preference for intercountry
adoption as a means of childcare and protection. 09 The first and most ideal
practice is for children to grow up with their family of birth." 0 When this is
not possible, a family should be sought within the child's country of origin.
When in-country adoption is not possible, then intercountry adoption may be
101 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 15.
102 Smolin, Indian Adoption Scandals, supra note 4, at 447-450.
103 Id.
104 Noelle Knox, Orphans Caught in the Middle, USA TODAY, May 18, 2004, at ID.
"I5 See UNICEF Baltics Report, supra note 9.
106 Id. at 1.
107 Id.
108 Id.
1 9 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53.
110 Id.
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considered as a way to provide a child with a home. I Although not stated
explicitly, the Permanent Bureau position seems to view intercountry
adoption as a temporary solution."
2
While each side of the international adoption debate offers a different
viewpoint, it is important to note that the underlying premise-that
intercountry adoption has "sides"-makes these simply a variation on the
more traditional strands of debate. Both, to some extent, place a value on
intercountry adoption and the legal instrument that governs it, instead of
treating it as a valuable neutral framework that can accommodate the
different concerns and preferences that the various parties may have.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT
A. Introduction: Why a Comparison?
The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Hague Convention developed
from seemingly diametrically opposed mandates. Congress created the
ICWA to make the adoption of Native American children by non-Indians as
difficult as possible. 113 The Hague Convention was developed, at least in
part, to facilitate intercountry adoptions. 114 Yet, a closer examination shows
that the two instruments share similar contexts, albeit dealt with in different
ways. Creators of both documents were concerned with exploitations and
abuses in the adoption system. Native American communities argued that
the skewed social work practices in deciding parental rights and neglect
criteria were decimating the Indian family. 115 Similarly, participants in the
debate on intercountry adoption have pointed out that the lack of fixed
1" Id.
112 Id.
113 See Andrea V. W. Wan, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Inupiat Customs: A Case
Study of Conflicting Values, with Suggestions for Change, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 43, 43-44
(2004) (noting that ICWA " was.. .intended to ensure that Indian and Alaska native children
were not removed from the communities and culture in which they were born.").
114 See Hague Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. See also Carlson, supra note 53. Not
everyone agrees with this genesis of the Hague Convention. For instance, Richard Carlson
argues that, from its inception, the Hague Convention was subject to disparate visions. On the
one hand, the Convention was viewed by many, mainly in Western states as a means to
facilitate intercountry adoption. On the other hand, the Convention was viewed by many
delegates, particularly those representing sending countries much more restrictively, mainly as
an instrument to curtail abuses. See Carlson, supra note 53.
"s See generally Samuel Prim, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Existing Indian
Family Exception: Re routing the Trail of Tears?, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 115, 115
(discussing removal of Indian children based on misconceptions in dominant culture).
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guidelines or harmonized laws leads to the exploitation of children for
financial gain in the country of origin. 16
Intercountry adoption and the adoption of Native American children in
the United States have many points of comparison. Both debates resonate
with notions of historical exploitation by a dominant white race over
indigenous cultures. The debates are suffused with similar claims regarding
the inherent biases towards nuclear family formation within the system of
adoption. 1 17 Finally, each debate involves notions of sovereignty implicated
within a larger debate on individual rights versus group rights.
Because of the unique approach that Congress took regarding the
adoption of Native American children, the ICWA represents the best
municipal instrument for the comparison of the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption. The unique relationship between the federal
government and Native Americans makes the ICWA a governing law that
nonetheless recognizes American tribes as semi-sovereign nations."8
Similarly, the Hague Convention is meant to govern the behavior of private
individuals indirectly through laws that affect the behavior of sovereigns.
Yet each document takes a radically different approach in its attempt to deal
with these competing interests. By comparing the text and the background
of these two instruments, I hope to add some insight into how we can
approach this debate in the future.
B. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, adopted on May 29,
1993, was a breakthrough in international law. As one author notes, "[t]his
agreement signifies the beginning of a global community approach to
international adoption concerns and cooperation, and recognizes that private,
partisan competition, and unregulated adoption work cannot continue
without establishing proper international childcare principles and
practices."' 19
The Hague Convention was the result of a multi-year process hosted by
the Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption.' 20 The Conference itself
16 See Graff, supra note 7, at 426.
117 Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Current Status and Future Prospects, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, No. 1.83, 93 (1993).
"b Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself: The Indian Child Welfare Act as Inapplicable
and Inappropriate to the Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy, 38 BRANDEIS L.
J. 47, 54 (1999 -2000).
19 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS: LAWS AND PERSPECTIVES OF 'SENDING' COUNTRIES
(Eliezer Jaffe, ed., 1995).
120 For an overview of the Hague Conference on Private International Law see INNOCENTI
DIGEST supra note 11, at 5.
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was significant because it represented the first time that non-member states
participated in the drafting of a Hague Convention.' 2 1 The objectives of the
Convention were as follows: (1) to establish safeguards to ensure that
intercountry adoption is in the best interests of the child (and with respect of
his fundamental rights); (2) to establish a system of co-operation amongst
contracting states to ensure that those safeguards are respected; (3) to
prevent abduction, child trafficking, and baby buying; and (4) to make sure
that adoptions between the states are given "full faith and credit." 122 The
Hague Convention is, at its heart, a practical document. It provides a means
for making intercountry adoptions more harmonious and efficient. 123 While
the Convention's preamble seems to promote the idea that a permanent
family is in the best interests of a parentless child, the enactment of the
Convention was not a means of developing families along cross-cultural
lines.
Superficially, the Hague Convention marks a shift in the view of
policymakers towards intercountry adoption as a desirable option. For
instance, one author notes that the preamble, discussing intercountry
adoption as a potential advantage to an adoptee "is very significant and
marks an important change by those who were responsible for the drafting of
the Hague Convention."' 24  In prior instruments on the subject of child
placement, intercountry adoption was typically relegated to a level of
desirability after foster care. 25 With the advent of the Hague Convention,
adoption was placed at the forefront of options to be pursued. However, in
drawing up the Hague Convention, members tried to make the document
acceptable to the widest number of individual states, both member and non-
member states. 126 As a result, the Hague Convention has left much of the
substantive law of adoption to the individual states. For instance, it allows
for some systems of adoption that do not terminate the biological parent's
rights. 27 Subsequent guidelines also made clear that states can be a party to
121 See Van Loon, REPORT supra note 89, at 13.
122 See HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 1.
123 Id. In fact, inviting non-member states was one of the ways the Conference hoped to
make the final document more harmonious.
124 William L. Pierce, Accreditation of Those who Arrange Adoptions Under the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption as a Means of Protecting, Through Private International
Law, the Rights of Children, 12 J. CONTEM. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 535, 538 (1996).
125 Id.
26 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 8.
127 See HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6 (recognizing that adoption can terminate the
pre-existing relationship between the child and his biological parents "if the adoption has this
effect in the Contracting State where it was made.") However, this is tempered by Art.27
which permits the adoption to terminate the parental rights if 1) the receiving State's law so
permit and 2) the biological parents consent. See also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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the Hague Convention even if they do not allow intercountry adoption
within its borders.1
28
Thus, many argue that the Hague Convention can be seen as a victory
for intercountry adoption and leading scholars view the final draft as
marking a definitive shift in favor of intercountry adoption. 9 However, a
closer analysis of the document and an examination of subsequent
statements by the Permanent Bureau (the institution responsible for
overseeing the Hague Convention) show that calling the Hague Convention
a victory for international adoption may be premature. At the least, it
demonstrates that the position of countries regarding intercountry adoption is
by no means a settled question.
A key concept debated during the Hague Conference was the idea of
"subsidiarity." ° Many of the drafters argued that intercountry adoption
should be pursued only as a last resort, after acceptable options within the
countries of origin failed. 13 1 What constituted "acceptable options" often
reflected the state and the culture. Again and again, during the debates
surrounding the drafting of the Convention, sending countries emphasized
the idea that intercountry adoption must occur only after corresponding
measures at home proved fruitless.' 32  Another concept that concerned
drafters was the idea that any instrument enacted should exclusively promote
the interests of the child. 133  The parent-driven model was resoundingly
condemned. 134  The Chairman of the Hague Conference on Intercountry
128 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 64.
129 Pierce, supra note 124, at 539. The author, one of the delegates to the Commission that
was responsible for drafting the Convention, notes the specific shift in the language of
adoption from the 1986 UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to the Foster Placement and
Adoption Nationally and Internationally (the "1986 Declaration") and the 1993 Hague
Convention. As he states, "the 1993 Hague Convention speaks of finding 'a suitable family'
whereas the 1986 Declaration speaks of caring for a child in 'any suitable manner.' In 1993,
the position clearly favors suitable family care for children even if it is necessary to allow a
child to leave its country of origin." Similarly, the shift is apparent when comparing the
Convention to Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id.
130 Van Loon, REPORT, supra note 89, at 55. For a discussion of subsidiarity generally, see
INNOCENTI DIGEST, supra note 11, at 5.
131 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53.
132 See MINUTES OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 356 (Part of the working documents for the
Hague Convention). A corollary issue emphasized by Columbia was the idea that intercountry
adoption was being pursued because it was good for the child not because the State of origin
could not take care of its own.
133 Id.
134 See e.g., MINUTES OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 356 (where the Chairman "asked the
delegates never to lose sight of the fact that the Convention is intended to give a family to a
child and not a child to a family.").
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Adoption reminded participants that the goal of intercountry adoption was to
provide a child with a family, not a family with a child.135  Subsequent
statements by the Permanent Bureau emphasize both points, that
intercountry adoption should be pursued only when suitable in-country
options fail and that intercountry adoption should be done in a way that
looks primarily at the interests of the child.'
36
C. The Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act represents an aberration in an otherwise
longstanding tradition in adoption law. Prior to its enactment, the standard
for deciding adoption and child custody cases was solely based on a
determination of the best interests of the child. This standard, first
articulated by State ex rel Sparks v. Reeves, 137 was adopted universally
through caselaw, statutes, and international instruments. At the time,
advocates viewed the standard as the ideal solution for dealing with adoption
issues. It offered enough flexibility for courts to consider a variety of factors
particular to a given situation while recognizing that the primary goal was to
serve the interests of the child. However, scholars began to point out that
the best interests of the child standard seemed to promote underlying biases
regarding race, gender, culture, and family.'
38
These biases were particularly apparent in the adoption of Native
American' 39 children. At the time of the ICWA's enactment, statistics
revealed that white social workers had a strong bias against the Indian home
environment. As a result, Native American children were one-third more
likely to be removed from their family and adopted, almost without
exception, into a white household. 40  Moreover, social workers gave
subjective reasons, like neglect and abandonment, for the termination of
parental rights.' 41 These reasons were not easily quantifiable and subject to
115 See SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT 243 (part of the working documents for the Hague
Conference).
136 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53.
'3 97 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957).
13' This manifested itself in a myriad of ways: for instance, the almost un-rebuttable
presumption in child custody cases that the best interests of the child was with his mother,
Hansen v. Hansen, 169N.W. 2d 12 (Minn. 1969); the view that the best interests of the child
requires him to be placed in a heterosexual family, Lofion v. Secretary of Children and Family
Services, 358 F. 3d. 804 (11th Cir. 2004); and a presumption that the best interests of the child
was served by placing the child in a family that was racially homogeneous, In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A. 2d. 1036 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1994).
9 Given the title of the statute under discussion, this article will use the term Native
American and Indian interchangeably.
140 Prim, supra note 115, at 115.
141 Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification of the
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many biases, both conscious or unconscious.1
42
The ICWA has three main objectives: (1) to preserve the promotion of
Indian families, their security, and stability; (2) to establish minimum
guidelines for the removal of Indian children from their families; and (3) to
establish welfare services to Indian communities for the operation of child
services.143 These objectives sought to establish guidelines and preferences
if adoption became necessary, not to promote adoption of Indian children
out of their homes.
Congress, in its findings, enumerated at the beginning of the legislation,
recognized this bias by stating that, "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions."'144 As a result, the legislature enacted a statute that
provided for a revised best interest of the child standard. 45 This standard
recognized Congress' duty "to protect the best interests of Indian
children,"'146 by "promot[ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal
of Indian children from the families.., which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture."'
147
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AXES OF DEBATE
One of the issues highlighted previously is the intractability of the
opposing positions on the issue of intercountry adoption. An examination of
each side's position tends to show that the arguments fall along three axes of
debate: issues of rights, culture and family. In taking a position either for or
against intercountry adoption, each side, consciously or unconsciously,
makes hierarchal preferences among the axes. This can have many
permutations. For instance, many proponents of intercountry adoption tend
to view the formation of a family as the primary importance. For other
proponents, a child's right not to be institutionalized outweighs any other
consideration. On the other end, opponents of intercountry adoption believe
that a child's cultural identity outstrips his need for a family or that placing a
child in a non-traditional family structure may be more important than the
Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 21, 28 (1997).
142 Prim, supra note 115, at 115.
143 Id
I- ICWA § 1901.
145 Id
146 Id.
147 Id. at § 1902.
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traditional paradigm of the nuclear family that informs intercountry
adoption. As such, what has been missing from the debate so far has been
an examination and deconstruction of these three axes: family, culture, and
rights. By comparing how two major adoption laws deal with these axes of
debate, we can develop a better understanding of whether the Hague
Convention adequately accommodates the different choices made by each
participant in intercountry adoption.
Both the ICWA and the Hague Convention provide guidelines on how
to treat issues of family, culture, and rights. While both articulate a "best
interests of the child" standard in the context of adoption, the interplay of the
axes of debate within the context of that standard manifests itself in very
different ways. 148  Clearly many of the axes intersect. For instance,
transnational adoption typically involves the right of a sovereign sending
state to terminate the cultural identity of a child in order to place him or her
within that country's notion of a family. Comparing the ICWA to the Hague
Convention can offer insight into the ability of the current legal framework
to accommodate both sides to the intercountry adoption debate.
The ICWA's preamble makes it clear that the drafters intended to bring
the issue of culture, family, and, to a lesser extent, rights to the forefront of
the legislation. In contrast, the Hague Convention's treatment of family,
culture, and rights is much more subtle. With the exception of the
promulgation of the rights of the child (embodied in the "best interests"
standard laid out in the preamble and restated throughout the document), the
Hague Convention in fact has seemingly very little to say about its position
on family or culture. However, a close examination of the language of the
treaty shows the underlying assumptions present in the Hague Convention
and offers a view of what an accommodating framework might look like.
A. Family
The debate on family can be examined in two ways. The first and most
obvious construct regards the family structure. Is there a preference for a
nuclear or expanded family? The second construct regards family creation.
Is a family created biologically or through other means, like adoption)?
Both the ICWA and the Hague Convention, whether explicitly or implicitly,
provide some insight into how the idea of family is constructed and offer
48 Each side is using the best interest of the child as part of the debate on intercountry
adoption. A full analysis of this standard is beyond the scope of this article but, at the least, it
is important to say that the use of the best interest of the child standard on both sides of the
adoption debate is either a reflection of its genius towards flexibility or its complete
obsolescence to the current landscape of adoption. My personal view is that it is a red herring,
bandied about far too often to be in anyway meaningful and distracting the players from the
real issues surrounding intercountry adoption.
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insight into what accommodations can be made on the subject.' 49Wester
concepts of family typically limit family structure and its role in child
rearing to a nuclear family construct, barring exceptional circumstances.'
50
Expansive child-rearing structures, where other family members have
primary care giving responsibility to the child, are generally thought of as a
failure in family structure. In contrast, many Eastern and African countries
take a much more expansive view. The traditional saying "it takes a village
to raise a child" models this expansive view of family structure and its role
in child rearing. This has significant implications for intercountry adoption.
It can influence when a child may legally be deemed an orphan.
Furthermore, it impacts what family structure is viewed as failing a child,
thus making him eligible for adoption.'
51
Similarly, in the United States and other Western countries, current
adoption law is promulgated in favor of creating families that mimic a
biologically based one.15  This manifests in the preference for a two-parent
household, 53 the practice of placing children with parents of similar
physical characteristics,' 54 and the issuance of a new birth certificate when
the adoption is final.' 55
The idea of mimicking adoptions after biologically based family
patterns has far reaching impacts on the adoption debate. It informs the
issue of adoption by same sex couples, the termination of parental rights, the
disclosure of identifying information of the adoptee, and even the nature of
adoption itself.156 Within the realm of intercountry adoption, this idea also
149 Some commentators suggest that, at least with ICWA, the idea of family can be
delineated another way: The idea of a tribal nation as family. As one article notes "[t]he
ICWA not only recognizes the interest of the tribe in the Indian child and vice versa, but from
the perspective of U.S. adoption law it appears to grant a quasi-parental role to the tribe." See
Pauline Turner Strong & Kortney Kloppe-Orton, What is an Indian Family? Kinship,
Sovereignty and the Indian Child Welfare Act, at 4 (paper on file with author).
150 See Alissa M. Wilson, The Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the
Indian Child Welfare Act in In Re S.S. andR. S., 28 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 839, 841 (1997).
s' See discussion infra part III.A.1 on ICWA and family.
152 BARTHOLET, supra note 17. Bartholet argues that this makes adoption legally sanctified
discrimination. Bartholet notes that adoption is the last legal framework where preferences are
made for adoptive parents with certain racial, marital status and sexual orientation preferences.
As such, Bartholet argues that adoption turns the anti-discrimination laws on its head.
153 BARTHOLET, supra note 17, at 70.
'" Id. at 95. (For instance, matching children with blonde hair and blue eyes to parents
who have those same physical traits).
' Id. at 54.
156 For instance, traditionally adoption among European nations in the mid twentieth
century reflected the notion that adoption was thought of as a 'rebirth' where all ties to the
biological family would be terminated and the illusion was created that the adoptee was, in
fact, born into that family. D. Marianne Brower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms,
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impacts a number of issues. First, the Hague Convention attempts to
standardize practices among divergent nations. The idea of what type of
adoption would be sanctioned runs, implicitly or explicitly, throughout the
debates over various provisions of the Convention.' 57  More globally,
because intercountry adoption often involves adoption outside of one's
culture and race, the idea of mimicking family patterns after a typical
biological family is becoming increasingly challenged.
For proponents of intercountry adoption the formation of a family-by
any means necessary-is the primary goal in intercountry adoption.
Proponents look at an adoptive family structure as one that has equal merit,
and therefore should be afforded equal rights, as a biologically based
structure. 58 Similarly, while proponents of intercountry adoption generally
do not comment on their view of extended families versus nuclear families,
it seems that their assumption falls towards believing in the superiority of
the nuclear family. These advocates, primarily from developing countries,
tend to view children with non-traditional family ties as abandoned, intead
of examining whether other, more expansive caretaking roles are fulfilling
the child's need for a family.'
59
Critics of intercountry adoption seem to manifest a preference for
biologically based family formation. Generally speaking critics advocate for
more stringent laws regarding terminating biological ties.'60  Critics also
tend to recognize the value of non-traditional family structures such as
expanded child rearing.161
There are, of course, exceptions. Some advocates for intercountry
adoption may view expansive family structures as a benefit. However, this
usually develops with a view toward making non-traditional family
structures (such as single adults and domestic partners) more eligible to
adopt, not in viewing these same structures as equally eligible to provide for
a child as an alternative to adoption.
Domestic Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person's
Identities and Heritage: A Comparative Examination, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 587, 595 (2001).
This was reflected in the issuance of new birth certificates and the pattern of matching parents
with children who possessed similar biological features.
157 For instance, each one of the above mentioned issues was discussed and debated during
the Hague Conference. See generally MINUTES OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 356 (Part of the
working documents for the Hague Convention).
58 See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 17.
159 See, e.g., Van Loon, REPORT, supra note 89, at 43 (discussing the need to distinguish
between children on the street and children of the street (those who maintain some family
contact).
'60 See CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 30, at 55.
161 See Wilson, supra note 150, at 841.
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1. The Hague Convention and Family
The Hague Convention seems to punt on the concept of family within
the confines of intercountry adoption; the relevant language, found in the
preamble, obliges states to take "appropriate measures to enable the child to
remain in the care of his or her family of origin."'1 62 The Convention
however does not set out a definition of family. This could be a reflection of
the varying viewpoint of states regarding what a family is and the inability
among states to reach a consensus on the subject. However, members of the
Convention cite this as one of the flaws of the document.1 63 Interestingly,
the Hague Convention did not explicitly charge countries to provide
definitions regarding an acceptable family construct. Nonetheless, countries
would apply the municipal law of that country for the definition of family
and whether that would include a nuclear or expanded model.
While the Hague Convention is relatively silent on the concept of
family, the document tends to show support for the conventional nuclear
family structure. For instance, information is not taken on the prospective
parents' extended family. Non-traditional family structures, such as the
extended family participating in raising the child, are not factors that can be
used by the prospective parent to bolster their claim that they are able to
raise a child. 64 Instead, under home study models, only primary caregivers
are analyzed and examined for proper suitability. 165 Similarly, the Hague
Convention, grants parenting rights solely to the prospective guardian as
legal parent. No ancillary rights are given to any other family member that
may have helped raise the child.
166
The Hague Convention seems to reflect both sides of the debate
regarding the creation of the family and the preference for biologically
formed families. In one sense, the Hague Convention seems to accord great
weight to families formed under adoption. It makes clear that adopted
children should have the same rights as children who are formed through
more typical biological traditions. As such, it provides for equal protection
of families formed by adoption and those created biologically. Moreover,
this marks a change for some countries that did not accord adoptees the same
legal rights for inheritance.
The preamble of the Hague Convention states:
162 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, pmbl.
163 See INDIA'S REPLY TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE 1993
HAGUE CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND COOPERATION IN RESPECT OF
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION (2005), available at http://www.hcch.net.
164 See HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6.
165 Id.
166 Id,
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recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious
development of his or her personality should grow up in a
family environment... Recalling that each State should take, as a
matter of priority appropriate measures to enable the child to
remain in the care of his or family of origin, Recognizing that
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in
his or her state of origin.
167
Accordingly, the Hague Convention views families of origin as the
most appropriate unit of care. However, culture is not mentioned as a
defining aspect of the family. The Convention attempts to straddle the fence
by discussing the necessity of maintaining an adoptee in a family of origin
but not in staying in the country of origin. A number of alternative
conclusions can be drawn from this position. First, the drafters gave
deference to countries that valued culture, yet the drafters did so without
contradicting the essence of the Convention's guidelines on intercountry
adoptions. Second, one could argue that the Convention places a higher
priority on family than culture. This conclusion conflicts with the high
priority many countries place on culture and national identity. Third, the
Convention's language gives a fluid concept to family and culture. Instead
of viewing the values as either/or concepts, the Convention seems to view
the idea of culture and family as intertwined concepts that can transcend
geographic location.
2. The ICWA and Family
The ICWA discusses or references family throughout the statute.
168
The aim of the ICWA, as stated in its declaration of policy is not to promote
adoption but rather to protect and preserve Indian families. 169 This has a
significant impact on the tone of the statute. The ICWA sees adopting
167 Id. pmbl.
168 The relevant sections of ICWA that touch on family or guardianship issues are: the
Preamble and Congressional findings; § 1902 (declaration of policy); § 1903 (definitions); §
1911 (state court proceedings); § 1912 (pending court proceedings); § 1913 (parental rights;
voluntary termination); § 1914 (court petitions); §1915 (placement of Indian children); and §
1931 (grants for reservation programs).
169 ICWA § 1902 states:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes.
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children out of Indian families as an obstacle to the preservation of Indian
tribes. As such, the statute establishes rules that place structural obstacles
and limits on the number of adoptions outside of the Indian family.' 70 In the
statute, the Indian tribe seems to play three roles: as a sovereign with
exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings which involve their children; as a
tribe with group rights that come from their position as a community; and in
a familial role in its capacity as a preference category for custody of Indian
children. 171
The ICWA takes a clear stand on the concept of family, broadening its
view of family from the typical Western nuclear concept. The drafters
recognized that part of the justification for adopting children out of tribes
was an argument of neglect.' 72 Social workers viewed alternative family
arrangements involving child rearing by extended family members or other
members of the tribe as tantamount to "neglect" and thereby grounds for
removal. 73 The drafters hoped to correct the biases displayed regarding
preferences for a nuclear family arrangement to child rearing. As a result,
the statute outlines three alternative groups (besides parents) that could take
part in the child rearing of the Indian child: an "Indian custodian,"' 74 an
extended family member, or the Indian child's tribe. 7 5 The idea of the
extended family permeates all of the ICWA. It extends not just to
preferences for an Indian child to be adopted within the tribe but also is
apparent in the expansive notice requirements for Indian custodians and the
tribe.' 76 In fact, hearings leading up to the enactment recognized that, (as
one article notes):
the Indian notion of family can extend to cover 'scores of,
perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close,
responsible members of the family,' and that under this
caregiving pattern it is considered normal and acceptable to
leave a child with any of these family members. Congress made
clear that in giving the tribes jurisdiction of many child welfare
170 ICWA § 1915.
171 See ICWA § 1911 (establishing exclusive jurisdiction); ICWA § 1901 (recognizing the
special place of Indian tribes as a commubity) and; ICWA § 1915; (providing for the tribe as
one of the adoptive placements)
172 See Wilson, supra note 150, at 831.
173 Id.
174 According to the statute, an Indian custodian "means any Indian person who has legal
custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary
physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child." ICWA
§ 1903.
175 ICWA §1913.
176 ICWA §1912.
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cases, and in providing 'minimum federal standards and
procedural safeguards' in custody cases involving Indian
children that are heard in state courts, it intended to prevent
situations where a social worker or judge sought to terminate the
parents' rights simply because that official was unfamiliar with
or unwilling to accept these caregiving arrangements.'7
While the ICWA contradicts traditional notions of family structure, it
does not completely shun traditional notions on the creation of a family. For
instance, traditional views consider adoption as the less desirable preference
for forming a family. 178  Adherents to these traditional views regard
bloodlines as particularly significant in determining what constitutes a
family. 179  Scholars argue that there is a fundamental preference in our
culture for designs of family that are formed around bloodlines.18 0  The
ICWA also reflects this view of family.'
8
'
The idea of bloodlines determining family is a very strong current that
runs through many Native American cultures. 82 As such, the ICWA
manifests an idea of biologism-a preference for families based on
bloodlines. The ICWA recognizes that tribes have different definitions of
what makes a child Indian. 183 Some commentators argue that the concept of
some tribes rejecting conventional definitions of identity through blood
marks a rejection of biologism.184 Yet, in fact, this reinforces that bloodlines
are important, albeit under expanded definitions. All of the tribes seem to
base at least some aspect of membership on Indian ancestry and bloodlines.
Therefore, expanding the definition of an Indian child to include a child who
is only "1/16" Indian blood is not a rejection of bloodlines as the basis for
family, but rather a view taken by the tribe that their bloodlines are so much
a part of the concept of family that it still forms the basis of attachment, even
... See Strong & Kloppe-Orton, supra note 149, at 6.
118 This is not a particularly Western notion. For instance, in Marshallese culture the
biological lines of family are so strong that the idea that a law can decide that a biological
mother is no longer part of her child's family and terminate her rights, is offensive and does
not exist under Marshallese law. See Jini L. Roby, Understanding Sending Country's
Traditions and Policies in International Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J.
L. & FAM. STUD. 303, 303,310-11 (2004).
17 Christine Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for
the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICs & PuB. POL'Y 543, 576 (1996).
Is0 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Wan, supra note 113, at 65.
183 Bakeis, supra note 179, at 576. For instance, some tribes consider one to be an Indian
child even if the child is only 1/16th Indian. Others will reject you under this standard. Id.
184 Id.
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when it has been diluted by other intermingling genes. ' 8 5
B. Culture
The intercountry adoption debate is suffused with the concept of
culture, on both an individual and a societal level. Individually, critics of
intercountry adoption believe that the loss of a child's cultural heritage
(which inevitably occurs during intercountry adoption) leads to the loss of
the child's identity. 86 As such, the cultural component, at a minimum, must
play a role in evaluating the best interests of the child. In some instances,
the threat of loss of cultural heritage can be enough to proscribe intercountry
adoption altogether. Proponents in the debate meanwhile argue that a
child's culture is insignificant at a young age and that there are little
variations in the psychological development of children.1
8 7
Many in favor of intercountry adoption believe that it is important to
expose the child to the cultural aspects of the place of his or her birth.1 88 But
what does that mean exactly? Since the child will have moved to a new
country, the parent inevitably exposes the child to these cultural aspects
through a Western perspective. Moreover, while some believe that the
adopted child's cultural background should be developed, they contend
exposure must be done in small doses. 89  Anything more is thought to
confuse the child.' 90 For instance, Myra Alperson, an adoptive mother,
offers this advice:
Don't confuse your child! Be who you are: the child's parent
and role model. You (parent and child) are now part of a special
unique family. Don't deny your culture and don't deny his or
hers. Celebrate who you each are.
During my home study interview, when I had decided to adopt
from China, I was asked what my thoughts were about how I
would raise my child. "Well," I said, "I live near a university
that has a large East Asian studies program, and I'm thinking of
1 In many ways this is similar to views of race that was historically held throughout the
South. Often referred to as the "one drop rule," these laws provided that you were still
considered black even if you displayed exclusively Caucasian features if you were found to
have any "Negroid" ancestry in your bloodline. Sharona Hoffman, Racially Tailored Medicine
Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 395,416 n. 140 (2005).
186 Antonio Buti, The Australian 'Stolen Generations' and Reparations, paper presented at
the University of Texas Law School, Mar. 2006, p. 6 (paper on file with author).
87 See Dillon, supra note 7.
188 BARTHOLET, supra note 17, at 106
189 ALPERSON, supra note 58, at 114.
190 Id.
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looking for a baby-sitter who is from China or someone who
speaks Chinese who can raise my child to know about Chinese
things." My social worker said this was absolutely the wrong
way to choose a baby-sitter. Above all, she said, I needed to
find someone who loved children and was experienced with
them. The cultural emphasis might be confusing - to me and
the child.
19 1
Alperson credits this as "one of the best pieces of advice I got" and
agrees with the implicit message from the social worker that too much
cultural emphasis may make her child feel "that her loyalties must be
divided."' 192 This conversation mirrors many of the biases that played out
within the Indian Child Welfare Act. While on the surface it may look as if
the debate focuses on the child, there is an underlying presumption that the
caregiver cannot serve the dual functions of exposing the child to her native
culture while loving and caring for the child.
Societally, culture and cultural exploitation underlies many of the pros
and cons on intercountry adoption. There is much acrimony inherent in the
process because of the cultural differences between sending and receiving
countries and the historical involvement of receiving countries in the
domination and exploitation of sending countries. As such, evaluating legal
instruments to determine their treatment of culture is crucial to advancing
the debate.
1. The Hague Convention and Culture
The Hague Convention gives short shrift to the concept of culture.
Buried in Article 16, the Convention sets forth the criteria for determining
whether a child is 'adoptable.' 193 It states that "due consideration" should be
given to the child's "ethnic, religious and cultural background."'1 94 Indeed,
the Hague Convention itself would seem to suggest that the drafters simply
did not believe cultural consideration were a significant factor.
While debating the issues on intercountry adoption, the drafters
recognized the need to discuss the impact of the child's cultural identity on
the adoption process. 195 However, the focus of such information seemed to
be on cultural identity as a source of data rather than cultural identity as a
source of identity in and of itself. This focus on the culture of the child
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 16
194 Id. The wording of the Convention is such that it seems to place ethnicity, religion and
culture together under one general factor of consideration.
195 See generally MINUTES OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE.
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dismisses the importance of culture as a defining formative part of a child's
identity, whether known or not, and instead tends to treat it as a series of
facts akin to genealogical or medical history.
196
Other provisions in the document reinforce the diminished importance
of culture. For instance, Article 21 of the Hague Convention requires a
number of actions when an adoption is deemed a failure, i.e., not in the best
interests of the child. These include: placing the child in temporary care;
arranging for another adoption; or placing the child in alternative long-term
care. 17  The convention explicitly considers returning the child to its
original country as a "last resort" option. 98 The reluctance to return the
child to the place of his cultural origin seems to suggest that culture is not a
weighty matter of consideration.
More subtly, the Hague Convention seems to give deference to Western
concepts of culture, often choosing Western standards on adoption matters.
When cultural norms and concerns are not at odds with westernized notions
of family, then the Hague Convention addresses these issues. For instance,
many nations have differing views on the effect of adoption. Some countries
maintain that it is culturally acceptable to prevent an adopted child from
inheriting property. 199 These same countries were concerned that a child
would not enjoy the same inheritance rights if adopted internationally. Parts
of the Hague Convention address this concern by granting full inheritance
rights to an adopted child.20 0
However, the Hague Convention follows Western norms when the
cultural norms of the sending country are at odds with these Western norms.
This is evident in what the Hague Convention considers a legally binding
adoption. For instance, in Western cultures, adoption is not just the
placement of children in a new prospective home, but also the termination of
parental rights by the biological parents.2° 1 In contrast, other non-Western
196 Of course, this then leads to the debate on whether or not a culture is truly yours and is
part of your formation if you do not know that this culture exists. In other words does culture
stand on its own as part of an individual's identity (as self-actualization) or does it needs to be
acknowledged to become a part of that? For information on the drafters' intent see Van Loon,
REPORT, supra note 89, at 99.
197 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 2 1.
198 Id.
199 Van Loon, REPORT, supra note 89, at 61
200 Roby, supra note 178, at 320.
201 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical
Operation of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (September 2005), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/concl33sc05_e.pdf. (hereinafter Special Commission
Report).
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states have a more fluid notion of adoption: rather than a choice of one
family over the other, adoption represents a cooperative effort whereby both
families are involved in the care of the children. 202 Nonetheless, the Hague
Convention, while allowing some national divergence, primarily tracks the
Westernized version.
20 3
In addition, the Hague Convention is distinctive for what it does not say
on culture. In both the ICWA and the CRC, the child's cultural identity is
seen as an integral consideration that should be embraced explicitly.20 4 In
contrast, the Hague Convention does not reflect the right of a child to
maintain cultural and national ties.
205
Given the permanency of adoption and the difficulty of overseeing how
a child is maintaining ties to his cultural heritage, this may have very little
practical effect. However, making such an aspirational declaration would
demonstrate the Convention's commitment to maintaining cultural ties with
the child's country of origin. As one author notes, "the uniform standards
[of the Hague Convention] cannot take into account cultural differences in
what is viewed to be 'in the best interests of the child."'
20 6
Subsequent developments appear to be more flexible on the issue of
culture. For instance, in their Guide to Good Practice, the Permanent Bureau
acknowledges that a state may only want to engage in intercountry adoption207
with states that share close cultural ties or a common language. This
seems to reflect a growing consensus on the importance of considering
culture in intercountry adoption. The Permanent Bureau notes, "[p]ost-
adoption services should also include measures to assist adopted children
preserve their cultural links with their country of origin, and assist adoptive
parents to recognise the value and importance of such links for the child's
future development." 2
08
202 See, e.g., Roby, supra note 178, at 304 (discussing how, "in Marshallese culture
adoption only bridged two families together to bring up children.").
203 See HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 26. (While the Hague Convention allows
for national regimes where biological parents can maintain some fights, it also has an override
provision where those rights can be terminated if the receiving (read Western) country allows
it and if the biological parents consent to it). See also Id. at 27.
204 ICWA § 1902; CRC Art. 29.
205 See generally HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6. See also Alice Hearst, Book Review
Essay, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 489, 491 (2002)(discussing the international instruments that
proclaim a child's heritage as a type of right that needs to be preserved).
206 Wallace, supra note 50, at 720.
207 Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 64.
200 Id. at 82.
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2. The ICWA and Culture
The ICWA explicitly embraces culture. It is embodied within the "best
interests of the child" 209 standard and in the concept of family. In fact, the
ICWA clearly links family and culture by ascribing special rights and
privileges to an Indian custodian.2 10 Moreover, the ICWA is unique in that it
demonstrates a clear hierarchal preference for preserving Indian culture,
sometimes over traditional Westernized notions of family. In that regard,
the ICWA embodies the philosophical stance that the way to preserve Indian
culture is through maintaining Indian children within their cultural unit.
The ICWA is much more explicit in its cultural preferences than the
Hague Convention. In taking such a strong stance culturally, the ICWA is
admittedly establishing other interests that should also be taken into account,
most notably, "the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes."
211
Presumably, the cultural identity of Indian tribes and the impact of a child's
cultural identity are inextricably linked. As such, there is a mutually
reinforcing benefit in establishing a child's home within his culture, even in
a non-traditional family setting. The drafters of the ICWA seemed
consistent in their approach to the preservation of Indian families as the
preservation of Indian culture. For instance, Section 1931 of the statute
provides for grants to be used for reservation programs. However, the
ICWA stipulates that preventing the break up of Indian families is a key
objective, accomplished by insuring that the removal of a child from the
custody of his parent or Indian custodian shall be a measure of last resort.
212
The ICWA's adoption preferences also show this deference to culture.
In establishing criteria for adoption out of the tribe, the ICWA establishes a
clear preference for placement inside, rather than placement outside, of the
tribe. The order of preference begins with a member of the child's
extended family, then another member of the child's tribe, and finally other
Indian families (presumably outside of the child's particular tribe).2 14 In
doing so, the ICWA again makes explicit within the framework of its statute
209 It seems that many of the problems associated with intercountry adoption occur when
the concept of the best interests of the child is taken out of its cultural and regional
understanding and applied in a seemingly neutral way but one instead that is filled with
territorial and Westernized biases. In an historical moment of clarity Congress understood this
dilemma and created ICWA. ICWA has many flaws, but one of its greatest achievements is
that it understood the tension between the pronounced standard and the differing concepts of
tribal and cultural interests.
210 A non-Native custodian does not have similar rights.
211 ICWA § 1902.
212 Id. § 1915
213 Id.
214 Id.
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that cultural preferences need to be upheld.215 In enacting its three-tiered
system of preference, the drafters of the ICWA also seemed to demonstrate a
view of Native American tribes as having a certain amount of shared cultural
attributes whereby adoption into other Native American tribes would be
preferable to adoption in the dominant culture.
The deference to culture can also be seen in less obvious ways in the
ICWA. For instance, when discussing the consent needed for the
termination of parental rights, the ICWA provides that an explanation of the
consent requirement must be explained either in English or in a language
that the parent or Indian custodian understands.2 16 This can be seen as a
great facilitator to the concept of culture since much of what is important for
a culture is lost when translated into language of the dominant culture.
2 17
C. Rights
Two separate concepts of rights that implicate the intercountry adoption
debate will be examined. First, what happens when the rights of the child
compete with the rights of others218 in the intercountry adoption process?
Second, what type of rights is a child entitled to within the context of
intercountry adoption?
The concept of rights, particularly with regard to children, developed
only recently. 219 During the twentieth century, the rights of the child went
beyond the traditional notion of protecting children (which in itself only
began after the industrial revolution)22 0 to the idea of protecting their liberty.
This included giving children a voice within a legal framework. 2 21
Concomitantly with this rise in the rights of the child was the recognition of
the rights of individuals generally, sometimes to the derogation of the rights
of the nation. Some of these rights include the right of protection from
sexual exploitation and abuse ("protectionist rights") as well as the right to a
215 It is interesting to note that this constricted view of preferences could have been
handled another way. For instance, in setting up hierarchies for foster care, a similar hierarchy
is established that gives preference to in-tribe options. However, in this instance the tribe was
given deference to establish another system of preference. One wonders why similar
flexibility was not given within the context of adoption.
216 ICWA § 1913.
217 Cf, CRC supra note 76, at art. 29 (discussing the importance of language and culture of
the child).
218 There are many "others" whose interests can compete with the child; this article will
examine the rights of the parent, the rights of the family (as a distinct unit) and the rights of a
nation.
219 LINDA MALONE, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 17 (2003).
220 David William Archard, Children and Rights, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/rights-children#2 (last visited on Nov. 17, 2005).
221 Id.
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222language and a national identity ("liberty rights"). More specifically and
more controversial is the notion that a child has a right to a family.
Often times there are competing interests that occur when the rights of
an individual are pitted against others, including when the rights of a child
compete with the rights of a parent, a family, or a nation.223 For example,
under Article 7(1) of the CRC, a child has the right to know her parents.224
However, that right is typically considered against the right of the child's
biological parents to keep their identity confidential from the child they
relinquished for adoption.
This notion of competing rights (particularly between a parent and a
child) is one of the more controversial aspects of the debate regarding
children in a legal framework. In fact, one of the main arguments advanced
for why the United States is one of two states not a party to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child is the treaty's potential for the empowerment of
children over their parents. 226 Domestic debate on U.S. ratification on the
CRC included those critics who claimed that passage of the treaty in the
United States would prevent parents from disciplining their children and
result in a prohibition on home schooling.
227
More recently, the competing interests component of the rights debate
has been explored within the context of intercountry adoption. Critics of
intercountry adoption claim that current models of intercountry adoption
provide that the rights of the parent take precedence over the rights of the
child.228 On the other hand, proponents of intercountry adoption contend
that promoting the rights of the parent will ipso facto promote the rights of
the child.229
The type of children's rights emphasized in the intercountry adoption
debate often depends on what side you choose. For instance, proponents of
intercountry adoption claim that they are promoting the child's protectionist
222 See generally CRC.
223 For instance, the debate on whether adoption should be parent driven or child driven is
simply another way of framing whose rights should be paramount within the context of
adoption, the parent's or the child.
224 CRC, art. 7(1).
225 Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 80.
226 See, e.g., Christopher Klicka, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: The
Most Dangerous Attack on Parents' Rights in the History of the United States, available at
http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/000000/0000020.asp.
227 Id. (stating "[tihis Treaty will essentially outlaw spanking").
228 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
229 See, e.g., Note, Donovan Steltzner, Intercountry Adoption; Towards a Regime that
Recognizes the "Best Interests" of Adoptive Parents, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 113, 115
(stating that the best interests of the child and their adoptive parents "while seemingly in
conflict, are, at their roots, inseparable.")
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right, namely his right to a family. 23  In contrast, critics tend to emphasize
the child's liberty rights, namely the child's right to know his cultural and
national identity, something that critics claim is stripped by the process of
intercountry adoption.231 The Hague Convention and the ICWA encompass
both aspects of the rights debate, however the Hague Convention seems to
emphasize the rights of the child while the ICWA seems to promote group
rights.
1. The Hague Convention and Rights
The Hague Convention follows the model of many human rights
treaties in how it examines the state's obligations towards individual rights.
For instance, there is very little discussion of states' rights set forth in the
document; reference to state behavior is done mainly within the context of
232the duty the state owes to a child. This is seen in the obligation
enumerated in the Hague Convention to ensure that intercountry adoptions
233are made in the best interests of the child. However, other provisions of
the Hague Convention may dilute the strong protectionist rhetoric of the
preamble. Article 4 of the Hague Convention provides for intercountry
adoption only after the state of origin has determined that in-country
possibilities were exhausted (which are not exclusively linked to family
placement).234 In doing so, the Hague Convention does not seem to apply
until the full consideration of in-country options takes place. This places the
rights of the group (namely the state) over the rights of the child for those
who believe that in-country placement does not serve the child's best
interest.
In addition, subsequent statements by the Permanent Bureau may also
dilute the individual child's right, particularly for those who view that a
child has an unconditional right to a family.235  Under the PermanentBureau's stance, even if a country is a signatory to the Hague Convention,
230 See Dillon, supra note 7. This claim can also be framed as a child's right to be free
from abuse or sexual exploitation, something proponents often claim the child would more
likely face without the benefits of intercountry adoption. Id. (claiming that the notion that
intercountry adoption saves children is fairly accurate).
231 See, e.g., Van Loon, REPORT, supra note 89, at 47 (discussing the challenges of inter-
country adoption from a cultural perspective).
232 See, e.g., HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 6 (discussing obligation to designate
a Central Authority to monitor the intercountry adoption process); id. at art. 18 (requiring that
states take "all necessary steps" to obtain from the child permission to leave the country).
233 Id. pmbl.
234 Id. art. 4.
235 Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 66.
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that state does not, in fact, need to participate in intercountry adoption.
236
The Permanent Bureau's position is that a country placing a moratorium
(definite or indefinite) on intercountry adoption is not inconsistent with the
237provisions of the Convention. The Permanent Bureau further states:
When implementing changes [to a country's adoption system], the use
of interim measures should be considered, to allow children in need of
permanent placement to find such a placement in a child-friendly time
frame, especially where arrangements for the placements have already
begun. Otherwise, children who are currently in institutions and in
immediate need of a family may unfortunately remain there for years unless
they are placed in permanent families through intercountry adoption. Thus
the absence of a national adoption system does not preclude intercountry
adoption, though it is clearly preferable for national adoption to be viable in
States Party to the Convention.
238
The Hague Convention enshrines both protectionist and liberty rights
for the child. The protectionist rights are obvious; from the beginning, the
Hague Convention provides for the best interests of the child and develops
mechanisms that will help maintain those interests. For instance, since
implementation of the Hague Convention, periodic special commissions
monitor and implement the provisions of the Convention. 239 Most recently,
delegates published its conclusions and recommendations in September
2005.240 Among the recommendations approved by the Special Commission
are those that emphasized the need for cooperation and communication
among states of origin and receiving states. 24 1  Specifically, the
recommendations encourage states to communicate regarding potential
adoptees to better understand the needs of children in States of origin.242 In
addition, the Special Commission encourages states to avoid unnecessary
delays that may keep a child from finding a permanent family home.
243
In addition, as part of the process of intercountry adoption, the
Permanent Bureau noted that the process of matching children with suitable
parents should have the best interest of the child in mind. Professionals
should conduct the matching and not the parents themselves. The Bureau
notes, "[p]arents should not visit an institution to pick out an appealing child
or choose a child from photo lists. Matching should not be done by
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 45.
239 SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 5.
242 Id. at 18.
243 Id.
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computer.",244 These two subsequent guidelines expand on the protectionist
rights that the Convention committed itself to with the propagation of the
best interest of the child standards.
More atypical are the liberty rights also enshrined in the Hague
Convention. Article 4(d) lays out the consideration that must be given to the
child within the context of adoption. Among the rights given to the child
(where appropriate) is his or her right to consent to the adoption.245 This
shows the respect given by the drafters to the Convention towards the child
and his ability to participate in his adoption and his fate. It further
recognizes that there are some instances where his consent may, in fact, be
required. Specifically, the Hague Convention requires the following: (1)
counseling and information be given to the child; (2) consideration being
given to the child's "wishes and opinions;" and (3) uncoerced, uninduced,
246
and documented legal consent (where consent is required). The Hague
Convention also has a provision on the confidentiality relating to the
parent's identity, which some may argue puts parental interests over the
247rights of the child. In reflecting the issues of a child's right to an identity,
members of the special commission re-emphasized the need to embody that
right. Recommendation number 17 encourages receiving states to
automatically grant adoptees nationality from one of the parents, without any
248action on the part of the parent.
2. The ICWA and Rights
The ICWA, in contrast to the Hague Convention, embodies
protectionist rights to a much lesser extent. The interests of the child, while
potentially one factor in a laundry list of considerations determining the
child's best interests, are not key to the completion of the adoption.
Moreover, any consideration that is given to the child's protection rights is
inextricably tied to the rights of the group (namely the Indian family) and
notions of culture.2 49
The ICWA's surrounding framework and its treatment of other aspects
of rights would seem to suggest that a child does not have a fundamental
right to be adopted-at least under American definitions of adoption.
Instead, group rights, the rights of the tribe, and other Indian families would
seem to take precedence over the rights of the child. For instance, the
244 See Guide to Good Practice, supra note 53, at 17.
245 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 4(d).
246 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 4.
247 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 6, art. 16.
248 SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135, at 6.
249 ICWA § 1902.
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ICWA would seem to imply that it is preferable for an Indian child to live
within the tribe, in legally defined foster care, rather than to have him or her
adopted by a non-native family.
250
In addition, the ICWA does not envision a scenario where the child's
consent would be key to the adoption process. Instead, the hierarchy places
the rights of the group (the tribe) over the rights of the individual child.251
This demonstrates less of a willingness than in the Hague Convention to
accord individualized liberty rights to the child (by allowing each individual
child to participate in the process, to the extent possible, through giving or
withholding his consent to the adoption). The ICWA does succeed over the
Hague Convention in according the child the right of cultural identity, a
liberty right that critics believe is lacking in the intercountry adoption
framework.
IV. A NEW PARADIGM
A. A GeneralAnalysis
There are practical implications to changing the debate on intercountry
adoption from "good or bad" to "what is important to you?" This new
paradigm would allow both prospective parents and countries to work within
the same legal framework while simultaneously allowing each "side" to hold
on to their respective beliefs. For instance, those advocates who believe that
culture is paramount would look to certain portions of the legal instrument.
Proponents of a rights based regime would look to other provisions. This
would offer enormous flexibility, with a system where what's important to
each side matches what is important to the sending country. 252 Moreover,
international law provides a unique opportunity for the development of such
a framework. Unlike typical national models for law making, international
law generally exists in a more egalitarian arena where laws are created by
agreement in a bilateral or multilateral framework, not imposed top down by
250 ICWA § 1918.
25 See, e.g., ICWA § 1902 (discussing the rights of the Indian tribe to preserve their
culture by maintaining children within their borders).
252 The Hague Convention, as a treaty, is a multilateral agreement between states.
However, because it involves a subject of private law, the choices to be made regarding what
type of an adoption is desirable essentially involves choices between prospective parents and
countries of origin. Countries of origin stand in the place of the biological parents and, as
such, must establish what it believes to be important for that family as a unit. In contrast, a
separate agency can be established to act as a representative of the child as a means of acting
solely on behalf of the child's interest, without considering the competing interests of the other
parties.
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a sovereign with the capacity to coerce. 253 As such, success requires a
model of consensus and not coercion. Moreover, this new paradigm should
apply a value neutral framework to accommodate the various preferences
that the nations have to the issues at hand. That way, it can provide for the
maximum amount of participation while still allowing for the particular
goals of a country. Likewise, parents who operate under this model can look
to the individual state and their laws to see which model best suits their
needs. In that way an effective matching of individual values can occur.
Older children as well can participate in the process, by using their
individualized preferences on issues such as culture, family, and rights to
decide their future.
Unfortunately, no framework yet conceived can fashion a way for
infants or small children to participate meaningfully in this process. As
such, the country of origin must stand in as proxy for its own interests and
values as well as for those of the small child. One potential solution would
be to appoint accrediting agencies as representatives for small children. The
agency would make determinations based on the its professional judgment
of what would work best for the child within the dynamics of culture, rights,
and family. However, this approach will be successful only if the agency is
truly independent from the country of origin's own hierarchal preferences,
allowing it to voice the position of the child and the child alone.
Nonetheless, this too is limited at best. There is no meaningful way to allow
a small child or infant to understand the decisions based on the various
254paradigms, much less voice their opinion.
B. Considering the Hague Convention within the New Paradigm
To date, most commentators evaluate the Hague Convention in the
wrong light. Instead of evaluating it from the point of view of whether or
not it helps or hinders intercountry adoption, we should evaluate it from the
point of view of whether or not it accommodates all the hierarchal
preferences. Seen in this light, many aspects of the Convention considered
weak, such as a lack of definitions on key concepts, can instead be seen as
expanding the relative options for all players in the intercountry adoption
debate. For instance, in the typical paradigm a significant shortfall in the
document is its lack of definition for family. In contrast, in an
accommodating framework the Convention's terseness allows different
visions on the rights of biological parents, leaving the door open for
253 See Cynthia Price Cohen, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 6
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 1, 92 (1993).
254 See Archard, supra note 220 (providing a general discussion on the dilemma on
meaningfully translating the rights of small children).
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divergent ideas on family creation.
However, the Convention could have gone further. By failing to
explicitly provide a role in the child rearing process for anyone other than
the child's parents, the Hague Conference missed a crucial opportunity to
validate other formations of family that have an impact on the child's
development. In this sense, the ICWA model appears to provide a more
accommodating framework that would allow for those roles which are
outside of the strict definition of parent but which nonetheless impact the
child's custody status.
The Convention's silence on issues of culture has a much more
detrimental effect in providing an accommodating framework. The
document itself is deficient; its slight mention of culture is not enough. In
that sense, the ICWA's explicit treatment of culture provides more fodder.
However, explicit endorsement of culture allows little room to accommodate
other viewpoints on the subject. Therefore, the ICWA's language on this
axis, while better than the Hague Convention's, is still problematic for
accommodating both sides of the debate. Instead, the Permanent Bureau's
subsequent treatment of culture may provide the best alternative for
accommodating both sides of the debate. Its recognition of placing a child
within a country of shared culture and language may counteract some of the
Westernized notions of culture suffused throughout the Hague Convention.
As for rights, the Convention manages to embody the protectionist
rights afforded to children under the CRC. Moreover, allowing for the child
to contribute to the determination of his placement to the extent possible is a
key victory for the accommodating framework. It allows the child himself
to maintain an individual voice without letting that voice overwhelm the
process entirely. In this regard, the Hague Convention offers a superior
alternative to the ICWA, which seems to have explicitly endorsed the rights
of the group over the rights of the individual.
One important development that the Permanent Bureau highlighted was
that states ratifying the Convention are not bound to engage in intercountry
adoption.255 As the Permanent Bureau noted "[r]atification/accession does
not imply commitment to a particular level of involvement in intercountry
adoption in the sense of an obligation to supply or receive a minimum
number of children through intercountry adoption."2 56  Rather, if the
contracting state does decide that intercountry adoption is appropriate, then
they will follow the procedures of the Convention. This allows states to
choose how to engage in the debate on their terms.
Perhaps the Convention's greatest victory for the accommodating
255 Id. at 64.
256 id.
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framework is in its constant deferral to contracting states. Within the
document, provisions are derogated by consideration of the laws of the
individual laws of the states. 7 In other sections, the document is silent on
the implementation of the Convention's goal. This provides further
deference to states in enacting laws that appropriately reflect their
circumstance. Finally, the Convention's silence on many of these provisions
allow leeway for subsequent guidelines, giving greater flexibility in
responding to needs in the debate as they arise.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention may offer the best framework for
accommodating the various positions along the intercountry adoption
spectrum. It allows sufficient flexibility within its model for those countries
who wish to engage in intercountry adoption and does not constrict those
countries that do not. Moreover, it defers to individual states on key issues
along the axes of family, culture, and rights. This allows States to adjust
their national policies within this framework to suit their needs. This
national divergence in turn provides variety for those parents who have
varying needs, such as those who view their rights as paramount.
Of course, the system is not perfect. There are failings. For instance,
the Hague Convention's treatment of culture imposes a hierarchy that places
the child's right to a family over his right to cultural identity rather than
embracing an accommodating preference. In this regard, the Hague
Convention could benefit from the spirit of the ICWA, although the
language from the statute itself may be too explicit.
The most effective way to change the system is through subsequent
guidelines that take into consideration the dynamics occurring within the
intercountry adoption debate and adjusts accordingly. As such, the current
pronouncements by the Permanent Bureau give hope. Its pronouncements
on key issues along the axes debate demonstrate its ability to respond
quickly and with sensitivity to the sides of the debate. It may provide the
best solution to preventing any side in the intercountry adoption debate from
becoming intractable in their position.
257 See, e.g., art. 16 (requiring that the state of origin be satisfied that the child is
adoptable) and arts. 26 & 27 (allowing for different municipal laws regarding biological
parents).
[Vol. 13:2
